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Fearing the Worst: The Importance of
Uncertainty for Inequality
Keith Blackburn and David Chivers
Abstract
We present an overlapping generations model in which aspirational
agents face uncertainty about the returns to human capital invest-
ment. This uncertainty implies the prospect that aspirations will not
be fullled, the probability of which is greater the lower is the human
capital endowment of an agent. We show that agents with su¢ ciently
low human capital endowments may experience such a strong inuence
of loss aversion that they abstain from human capital investment. We
further show how this behaviour may be transmitted through succes-
sive generations to cause initial inequalities to persist. These results
do not rely on any credit market imperfections, though they may ap-
pear as if they do.
JEL Classication: D31, D81, E24.
Keywords: Inequality, uncertainty, aspirations, loss aversion.
1 Introduction
Contemporary theories of income distribution are typically based on an ap-
peal to some form of market imperfection which creates di¤erent incentives
and opportunities for di¤erent individuals. Most prominent in this research
are models that rely on the imperfect functioning of capital markets for one
reason or another. The key implication of these models is that agents with
The authors are grateful to Paul Madden, Horst Zank and an anonymous referee for
helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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insu¢ cient wealth to serve as collateral for loans may be deterred or pre-
vented from accessing protable investment opportunities because of high
costs of borrowing or rationed availability of credit. Moreover, any initial
di¤erences in individual wealth may turn out to be persistent (permanent)
xtures such that the limiting distribution of wealth is characterised by the
same agent heterogeneity and income inequality as exists to begin with.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the models also yield further insights
by revealing how distributional outcomes can inuence aggregate economic
performance in terms of growth and development.
This paper does not seek to undermine the potential signicance of (nan-
cial) market imperfections in determining the relative fortunes of individuals.
Rather, its aim is to highlight another factor for consideration, one that is
possibly of equal importance but that has hitherto been largely (and rather
suprisingly) neglected by researchers. This is the role of risk in individual
decision making when the outcomes of decisions are uncertain.1
There are good reasons for thinking why aspects of risk and uncertainty
may be important for issues of distribution. Not least of these is the pre-
cautionary motive for savings which suggests that agentsdesire to insure
themselves against uncertainty leads them to create a "bu¤er-stock" level
of savings that increases with the degree of uncertainty. If one thinks of
this motive as being stronger for less wealthy agents (as suggested by em-
pirical observation), then one begins to realise why poorer members of the
population may be less likely to undertake wealth-enhancing ventures when
such ventures are relatively risky. In addition, by entertaining the notion of
intergenerational linkages, one may also start to contemplate the possibil-
ity of history-dependent behaviour and, with this, the prospect of persistent
inequality.
Our basic objective in this paper is to explore the idea that, in an uncer-
tain environment, distributional outcomes may have as much to do with the
structure of preferences as they have with the functioning of markets. We
approach this by appealing to some recent advancements in decision theory.
Specically, we call upon the hypothesis of aspiration-induced loss aversion
as a means of enlightening the type of behaviour that we envisage. This
hypothesis is based on the notion that individuals, faced with some risky
prospect, have concern over attaining (or not attaining) a certain level of
wealth to which they aspire. Any outcome above (below) this aspiration
level is regarded as a success (failure). The result of this is a value function
that reects individualsweighted preferences over the overall probability of
1For the purposes of this paper, we use the terms risk and uncertainty interchangeably,
and do not distinguish between the two.
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success and/or the overall probability of failure. These preferences can signif-
icantly inuence the evaluation of a prospect and are absent from standard
expected utility theory.
The concept of an aspiration level bears an obvious similarity to the con-
cept of a reference point used in prospect theory. An important di¤erence,
however, is the way that outcomes are dened: models based on reference
points take outcomes to be changes in wealth, whilst models based on as-
piriation levels take outcomes to be nal states of wealth. As mentioned
above, the preference for nal state wealth to be above some aspiration level
may have a signicant inuence on decision making. For example, individu-
als with relatively low levels of wealth to begin with will be relatively more
wary about taking on risks as they are relatively less able to bu¤er them-
selves against bad outcomes. This provides the basic intuition underlying our
analysis which shows how a su¢ ciently strong aversion to falling short of as-
pirations may induce the least wealthy agents to forego potentially protable,
but prohibitively risky, investment opportunities. Embedding these micro-
foundations in an overlapping generations framework, we also demonstrate
how initial inequalities may persist as a long-run feature of distributional out-
comes. The striking aspect of these results is that they are realised within
the context of a nancial environment in which borrowing and lending oppor-
tunties are unconstrained by any frictions. Rather than being the product
of credit market imperfections, they are driven more fundamentally by the
deep structure of preferences governing attitudes towards risk. Signicantly,
the behaviour produced by these preferences is practically identical to the
behaviour produced by nancial constraints. We are unaware of any other
analysis to o¤er a similar perspective and to establish similar insights.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
provide a brief overview of the literature that forms the background to our
investigation. In Section 3 we present the model that we use to conduct
our analysis. In Section 4 we deduce the equilibrium behaviour of agents.
In Section 5 we establish our main results. In Section 6 we comment on
these results within the context of other research, as well as outlining some
extensions of our analysis. In Section 7 we make a few concluding remarks.
2 Background Literature
The link between income distribution and the functioning of nancial markets
is formally articulated in a number of analyses that form a well-established
and inuential body of research (e.g., Aghion and Bolton 1997; Banerjee
and Newman 1993; Blackburn and Bose 2001; Galor and Zeira 1993; Piketty
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1997).2 Broadly speaking, this research seeks to examine the extent to which
capital market imperfections of one form or another (such as asymmetric
information or weak contract enforcement) can cause initial income inequal-
ities to persist over time. The basic idea is illustrated by considering an
environment in which agents face a choice between two types of production,
or investment, activity: the rst is a low-cost, but low-yielding, venture (e.g.,
subsistence production), whilst the second is a high-cost, but high-yielding,
endeavour (e.g., human capital investment). Agents obtain funding for the
latter by using their own endowments of wealth and by acquiring loans from
nancial intermediaries if necessary. Because of capital market imperfections,
the terms and conditions of loan contracts depend on agentswealth status:
poorer agents face higher costs of borrowing and/or higher requirements for
collateral. The upshot is that there is a critical level of wealth below which
agents are forced to undertake the low-yielding activity, whilst above which
agents enjoy access to the high-yielding venture. In a dynamic setting this
division of the population may endure through successive, interconnected
generations of agents if other circumstances prevail, such as indivisibilities
in investment. If so, then the limiting distribution of wealth is characterised
by two steady states as initial inequalities persist to produce a polarisation
between the rich and the poor. Evidently, since these cohorts engage in
di¤erent activities with di¤erent productivities, the extent of inequality has
implications for macroeconomic performance in terms of aggregate output
and possibly growth.
To many observers, theories of income distribution based on capital mar-
ket imperfections are compelling, not least because of the apparent pervasive-
ness of such frictions. Yet there is another feature of economies that is equally,
if not more, pervasive and that may be worth just as much consideration: this
is the existence of uncertainty, about which relatively little has been written
in connection with income distribution. This is somewhat surprising, given
the major role that risk can play in savings and investment decisions, the
outcomes of which, being realised in the future, are typically fraught with
uncertainty. For example, Krebs (2003) argues that investment in human
capital is particularly susceptible to idiosyncratic, uninsurable labour risk
(due to the unpredictability of employment opportunities and job-searching
time), whilst Grossman (2008) lists a variety of other reasons why such in-
vestment is risky, not least of which is individualsuncertainty about the
2This research developed alongside other work on income distribution that signalled a
general revival of interest in the subject. Amongst this work are models of redistribution
based on political motives (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994;
Perotti 1993) and models of inequality based on neighbourhood e¤ects (e.g., Benabou
1992; Durlauf 1993; Fernandez and Rogerson 1996).
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distribution of post-educational earnings (because of changes in technology
and demand conditions that may occur during the period of education). An-
other prime example of risky investment is the acquisition of equities, on
which some notable observations have been made, such as the tendency of
individuals to hold a smaller proportion of risky assets in their portolios the
greater is the degree of their income uncertainty and the lower is the level of
their wealth (e.g., Guiso et al. 1996; Aiyagar 1994). From a distributional
perspective, ones attention is particularly drawn to the last observation since
it suggests a connection between wealth accumulation and the amount of risk
that individuals are willing to bear. For this reason, it is important to under-
stand how attitudes towards risk might inuence decisions that govern the
relative fortunes of individuals who do not share the same wealth status.
As discussed by Guiso and Paiella (2008), there is a prevailing consen-
sus that individualsaversion towards risk is decreasing in wealth. Various
forms of utility function have been proposed to take account of this, though
many of these are used for the purposes of tractability, rather than for their
plausibility (e.g., Carroll and Kimball 1996). The idea, itself, accords with
ones intuition that, in the words of Rabin (2000), a dollar that helps us
avoid poverty is more valuable than a dollar that helps us become very rich.
Nevertheless, as pointed out by the same author, and emphasised further in
Rabin and Thaler (2001), there remains a problem: under standard expected
utility theory, risk averse behaviour for small stake gambles implies improb-
ably high risk aversion for large stake gambles such that the marginal utility
of wealth must decrease at an astronomical rate. Even if one ignores this,
it is questionable whether the modelling of risk aversion under conventional
expected utility theory is capable, by itself, of explaining why relatively poor
agents choose not to pursue potentially wealth-enhancing opportunities.
One way of moving forward from the above is to think beyond the stan-
dard paradigm of expected utility by exploring other concepts in decision
theory. Our attention is particularly drawn to the concept of loss aversion
which entertains the idea that individuals have a stronger preference for
avoiding losses than for acquiring gains. The concept was rst introduced by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their pioneering work on prospect theory.3
This theory makes two assertions about loss aversion: the rst is that agents
derive less utility from undertaking symmetric bets than they do from ac-
cepting the expected outcome with certainty; the second is that the extent of
aversion to such bets increases with the size of the stake. The type of utility
3This has become the dominant descriptive theory of decision making under uncer-
tainty. It is part of the broader literature on non-expected utility, a comprehensive review
of which can be found in Starmer (2000).
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function that captures these features is one that exhibits reference-dependent
asymmetry: relative to some benchmark outcome, losses are weighted more
heavily than gains (i.e., the utility function is steeper for bad states than for
good states). Thus, what matters to an individual when faced with some
gamble is not the total amount of income that he ends up with, but rather
the amount of income relative to some reference level, deviations from which
are evaluated di¤erently depending on whether they are positive or negative.
Diagramatically, the utility function is generally drawn S-shaped with a kink
at the reference point, where it changes from being convex (in the domain of
losses) to concave (in the domain of gains).4
The concept of loss aversion is particularly prominent in the eld of be-
havioural economics and nance, where it has been subject to much investi-
gation by decision theorists (e.g., Bleichrodt et al. 2009; Schmidt and Zank
2005) and applied by others to explain apparent anomalies and paradoxes,
such as the endowment e¤ect (e.g., Thaler 1980), the status quo bias (e.g.,
Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) and the equity premium puzzle (e.g., Be-
nartzi and Thaler 1995). Its application in macroeconomics remains much
more limited, and we are unaware of its use in any macro-type (dynamic
general equilibrium) model of inequality and income distribution. Our aim
in this paper is to develop such a model.5
Loss aversion draws attention to the importance of downside risk in shap-
ing individualspreferences. In models where this is motivated by reference
points, outcomes are dened in terms of changes in wealth and the extent of
loss aversion is reected in the shape of the utility function independently of
probabilities. As regards the latter aspect, it has been argued on the basis
of experimental evidence that a major concern for individuals in evaluating
risky prospects is the overall chances of success and failure. For example, Ed-
wards (1954) shows that individuals prefer low probabilities of large losses to
high probabilities of small losses, whilst Langer and Weber (2001) and Payne
(2005) reveal that individuals pay special consideration to the probabilities
of winning and losing as a whole.
To take account of the above, we turn to another, more recent, concept
in decision theory - namely, aspiration levels. The basic idea of this is that
individuals evaluate risky prospects according to their weighted preferences
over the overall probabilities of success and failure, where success and failure
are dened with respect to some aspirational outcome (e.g., Diecidue and
Van de Ven, 2008). Individuals whose initial wealth is above (below) their
4A selection of alternative functional forms can be found in Maggi (2004).
5Two recent macroeconomic applications of prospect theory are presented by Foellmi
et al. (2011) and Rosenblatt-Wisch (2008). The focus of each these is on the aggregate
implications of loss aversion in stochastic growth models.
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aspiration level may be thought of as seeking to maintain (improve) their
status, implying the possibility of risk averse (risk loving) behaviour in the
proximity of the threshold. The existence of aspiration levels has been de-
tected in several empirical studies (e.g., Holthausen 1981; Mezias 1988) and
it has been argued that individuals may use them as a means of simplify-
ing complex decision problems (e.g., Langer and Weber 2001; Mezias et al.
2002). Like reference points, aspiration levels may be dened with respect
to di¤erent target outcomes, such as maintaining initial wealth status, stay-
ing above the poverty line and avoiding situations of bankruptcy. Failure to
meet such targets is assumed to result in a direct disutility (psychic) cost
independently of any monetary cost. Whilst reference points and aspiration
levels are closely related, there are important di¤erences between them: the
latter is a probabilistic (rather than purely behavioural) concept that takes
outcomes to be nal states of (rather than changes in) wealth, and that gives
rise to a utility function which is discontinuous (rather than kinked) at the
threshold point. The last of these features has the e¤ect of reinforcing loss
aversion.6
Part of the motivation for our analysis derives from ideas relating to
precautionary savings behaviour, as discussed by Carroll (2001). The basic
reason for such behaviour is that, when confronted by uninsurable risk, in-
dividuals save as a means of bu¤ering themselves against future bad shocks.
Suppose that agents have some target level of consumption. A negative in-
come shock is of greater concern to poor agents than rich agents since the
former stand a higher chance of failing to reach their consumption target.
Less wealthy agents are therefore inclined to have a larger bu¤er stock
of savings on which they can draw.7 To the extent that these savings are
less productive than other, more risky, ways of disposing of income, initial
inequalities may be reinforced. By way of further illustration, consider the
following example which resonates more closely with our previous discussion.
6For a broad comparison of aspiration level models and prospect theory, see Lopes and
Oden (1999). In a wider context, we note that aspiration-based preferences bear some
similarity to, but are distinct from, maxi-min-type preferences. Unlike the former, the
latter do not generate discontinuities and do not involve reference dependence. Compared
to loss aversion, maxi-min preferences may similarly give rise to kinks, but these kinks
would be observed in the indi¤erence curves, rather than utility. The extent to which
our analysis (based on aspiration theory) is transferable to other behavioural models of
uncertainty is an interesting issue for further research.
7Note that this argument does not necessarily mean that poor agents save more in total
than rich agents. The argument refers specically to precautionary savings, the motive
for which intensies as wealth declines because of the greater inability to bu¤er ones
consumption against bad shocks (e.g., Carroll 2001). This is not inconsistent with total
savings being an increasing function of wealth.
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Imagine two agents who are faced with a gamble (a risky investment project,
perhaps) that o¤ers an equal chance of either winning or losing the same
amount of money. Suppose that these agents are identical except in terms of
their initial levels of wealth which lie above their common aspiration level (a
poverty line, for example). In the worst case scenario, the poorer agent falls
below the aspiration level, whilst the richer agent remains above it. Thus,
although the rewards are comparatively higher for the former, the stake that
is being risked is comparatively higher for him as well because of the higher
probability of not meeting his aspirations. Fearing the worst, this may induce
the poorer agent to abstain from the gamble (forego investment) altogether.
Similar to before, what this example illustrates is a tendency for less wealthy
individuals to be less inclined to pursue risky, but potentially protable, op-
portunities because the amount that they may lose is prohibitively costly for
them (i.e., failing to achieve their aspirations counts for more than increas-
ing their wealth). In this way, initial inequalities can cause diverse behaviour
(gambling or not gambling, investing or not investing) which strengthens
those inequalities and shapes distributional outcomes.
In the analysis that follows we seek to articulate the above ideas more
rigorously in a simple theoretical model. The model describes an overlapping
generations economy in which aspirational agents produce output using hu-
man capital, an initial distribution of which accounts for agent heterogeneity
whilst lineage transfers of which account for intergenerational linkages. An
agent accumulates human capital for himself by drawing on the human cap-
ital inherited from his parent and by undertaking his own self-improvements
of knowledge and ability. The agent can maximise his human capital ac-
cumulation by making some physical investment of resources, for which he
requires a loan from nancial intermediaries. This is risky because the re-
turns to human capital are uncertain and may not be high enough for an
agent to achieve his aspirations after settling loan repayments. Such an
outcome is more likely to occur the less is the amount of inherited human
capital. Against this background, we show how agents with su¢ ciently low
endowments of human capital may have such a strong aversion to losses that
they choose not to risk borrowing for human capital investment. We further
show how this behaviour can be transmitted through successive generations
to cause initial inequalities to persist. As indicated earlier, the striking aspect
of these results is that they do not rely on any credit market imperfections,
but rather are derived within the context of a nancial environment that
allows borrowing and lending to take place without impediment. In accor-
dance with Carroll (2001), there are some individuals who do not borrow,
not because they are unable to do so, but because they choose not to do so.
These are very di¤erent explanations, but another signicant insight of our
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analysis is that it may be very di¢ cult to distinguish between them since the
behavioural outcomes in each case are virtually the same.
A recent related analysis to ours is that of Genicot and Ray (2014) who
address the interesting matter of how aspirations are shaped and formed.
In particular, the authors construct a model in which aspirations are co-
determined endogenously with the distribution of income. The basic idea
is that individuals form their aspirations with reference to the social envi-
ronment (e.g., wealth distribution) which, in turn, evolves according to the
development of aspirations. It is shown how persistent inequality may result
from this. Whilst touching on similar issues, the focus of our own analysis is
quite di¤erent. Like most of the literature, we do not seek to delve deeply into
questions of what motivates and determines individual aspirations. Rather,
taking aspirations as given, our concern is to examine how the uncertain
prospect of attaining them might inuence distributional outcomes through
a di¤erential impact of loss aversion on individualsbehaviour. We similarly
show how persistent inequality may arise from this.
3 The Model
We consider a small open economy in which there is a constant population of
mortal, reproductive agents measuring a size of unit mass. Each agent lives
for two periods and belongs to a dynastic family of overlapping generations
connected through tranfers of human capital. Each agent has one parent and
one child, inheriting capabilities from the former and imparting capabilities
to the latter. Each agent is a potential investor in human capital when
young, and a producer and consumer of output when old. We proceed with
our formal description of the economy with reference to the circumstances
facing agents of generation t.
3.1 Preferences and Technologies
All agents have identical preferences dened over old-age consumption, or
income, xt+1, from which they derive a lifetime utility of ut = u(xt+1). Under
standard expected utility theory, an agents objective is to maximise E(ut).
Our departure from this involves a non-expected utility approach based on
aspiration level theory. In general, this theory posits an objective function
that depends not only on the expected utility of a prospect, but also on
the overall probability of success and/or the overall probability of failure in
attaining some target outcome. Denoting these probabilities by P s and P f ,
respectively, one imagines individuals as maximising a value function of the
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form Vt = E(ut)+P s P f , where  and  represent weighting parameters
that measure the importance of success and failure.
An agent aspires to achieving some target, or reference, level of income,
x > 0. The agent succeeds or fails in realising his aspirations according to
whether xt+1  x or xt+1 < x. By way of simplication, we assume that
agents care only about the prospect of failure ( = 0), the overall probability
of which is now denoted by P f = P (xt+1 < x). For further convenience,
we also assume that utility from consumption is linear, u(xt+1) = xt+1   x.
These features are inconsequential for our main results, as we demonstrate
subsequently under various extensions of the model. As matters stand at
present, the actual payo¤ to an agent is understood to be either xt+1   x if
xt+1  x, or xt+1   x    if xt+1 < x, implying the sort of discontinuity
which can account for loss aversion. The expected payo¤ to an agent is then
given by the value function
Vt = E(xt+1   x)  P (xt+1 < x): (1)
In the rst period of life an agent makes a decision about his investment,
it, in human capital.8 In the spirit of other analyses (e.g., Banerjee and
Newman 1993; Galor and Zeira 1993), we assume that there is a xed cost
of investment, k > 0, such that agents are faced with the binary choice of
either it = 0 or it = k. Since all agents are endowed with zero resources
to begin with, any of them who chooses the latter option must nance his
investment by borrowing. The concept of human capital in our model need
not be restricted to including just knowledge and skills, but may be thought
of more broadly as encompassing other personal attributes (most notably,
health) that enhance productive e¢ ciency. Whatever the interpretation, and
whatever choice is made, an agent accumulates human capital, ht+1, in a way
that depends on the human capital inherited from his parent, ht, augmented
by some additional, but uncertain, component, t+1. Specically,
ht+1 =

ht + b(1 + t+1) if it = 0;
ht +B(1 + t+1) if it = k;
(2)
where  2 (0; 1) and B > b > 0.9
8This is an investment of physical resources, rather than time or e¤ort. The latter may
be treated as being already subsumed into the behaviour of agents, who may be thought
of as devoting a xed amount of time or e¤ort to human capital production when they
are young.
9If the concept of human capital is conned to schooling and education, then the
target outcome, x, may be thought of as reecting an underlying target for academic
achievement to which individuals aspire. For example, xt+1  x may correspond to the
case in which a student graduates successfully, whilst xt+1 < x may represent the case in
which a student barely passes (or perhaps drops out of college altogether).
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The term t+1 in (2) is a bounded random variable with known proba-
bility distribution, but unknown realised value at the time that agents make
decisions. This variable may be thought of as capturing various personal
characteristics (e.g., innate ability, health status and all-round functional-
ity) that are randomly bestowed on agents and that agents become aware of
during the course of human capital formation. For any given realisation of
t+1, an agent ends up with more human capital if he invests resources in
improving his capabilities than if he foregoes such investment. The basic role
played by t+1 is to inject uncertainty into agentsfuture incomes by creating
uncertainty about their future productive e¢ ciency. An alternative approach
would be to assume that output production is, itself, stochastic (due to tech-
nology shocks), in which case a similar analysis could be conducted to obtain
essentially the same results. We choose the present modelling strategy arbi-
trarily and for no particular reason.10 For simplicity, we assume that t+1 is
uniformly distributed over the interval ( c; c) with probability density func-
tion f(t+1) =
1
2c
, where c < 1. The mean and variance of t+1 are therefore
0 and c
2
3
, respectively. In view of the latter, a measure of uncertainty in our
model is provided by c, an increase in which corresponds to a mean-preserving
spread in the distribution of t+1.
In the second period of life an agent produces output, yt+1, using his
human capital according to
yt+1 = Aht+1; (3)
where A > 0. Given this, the agent realises a nal income of xt+1 which
determines his nal consumption and nal utility.
An agents consumption depends on what action he took when young. If
the agent abstained from human capital investment (it = 0 in (2)), then he
consumes all of his realised output, A[ht+b(1+t+1)]. If the agent engaged
in human capital investment (it = k in (2)), then he consumes whatever
output is left over after paying back lenders in return for his loan of k.
Agents borrow from competitive nancial intermediaries that have access
to a perfectly elastic supply of loanable funds at the world rate of interest,
r > 0. As we have emphasised, there are no credit market imperfections in
our model. In particular, lenders do not face any problems of asymmetric
10Having said this, we note that our approach is well-motivated by our earlier discussion
about the various risks associated with human capital investment. The formulation in (2)
can be likened to the stochastic human capital production technologies used by Grossman
(2008) and Krebs (2003), to whom we referred in our discussion. The main focus of these
authors is on the role of human capital risk in inuencing growth, though the former
establishes this role with reference to initial wealth inequalities. Our own focus is centred
primarily on distribution in an environment with initial human capital inequalities.
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information (e.g., observing the incomes of agents) or contract enforcement
(e.g., preventing agents from absconding with loans). Problems that might
otherwise arise from these - such as moral hazard, costly state verication
and strategic defaulting - are therefore redundant and do not play any role
in our analysis. To focus attention even further, we also abstract from any
risk of bankruptcy by assuming that agents are always able to repay their
loans. We return to these aspects later when we broaden the context of
our analysis to study issues relating to the functioning of nancial markets.
For now, we note that, since competition between intermediaries drives their
prots to zero, the rate of interest charged on loans to agents is simply equal
to intermediariesown cost of borrowing, r. Given this, then the size of an
agents loan repayment is (1+r)k, which leaves A[ht+B(1+t+1)] (1+r)k
to be consumed. In summary, we may write the consumption prole of agents
under alternative choices as
xt+1 =

A[ht + b(1 + t+1)] if it = 0;
A[ht +B(1 + t+1)]  (1 + r)k if it = k. (4)
Of ultimate concern to each agent is his expected payo¤ in (1), which
incorporates his fear of failing to achieve his aspirations. We assume that
there is no such anxiety if an agent foregoes human capital investment, which
acts as a safety option in the sense of always yielding an income at least equal
to the reference level, A[ht+b(1+t+1)] > x
.11 The agents expected payo¤
in this case is simply
Vtjit=0 = A[ht + b]  x: (5)
Conversely, investment in human capital means that aspirations may or may
not be realised depending on whether A[ht+B(1+t+1)]  (1+r)k  x or
A[ht +B(1 + t+1)]  (1 + r)k < x. Accordingly, we may deduce a critical
value of t+1 - bt+1, say - such that aspirations are attained if t+1  bt+1
and are unattained if t+1 < bt+1. That is,
A[ht +B(1 + bt+1)] = (1 + r)k + x: (6)
Given this, we may then compute an agents expected payo¤ from human
capital investment as
Vtjit=k =
Z c
 c
fA[ht +B(1 + t+1)]  (1 + r)kgf(t+1)dt+1 (7)
  
Z bt+1
 c
f(t+1)dt+1   x
11This can be ensured by assuming that A[hL0 + b(1  c)] > x, where hL0 denotes the
lowest initial human capital endowment amongst agents.
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3.2 The Decision Problem of Agents
The basic choice that agents confront is whether or not to invest in human
capital. Obviously, an agent will choose to invest if his expected payo¤ from
doing so is no less than his expected payo¤ from not doing so: that is, if
Vtjit=k  Vtjit=0.
Our subsequent analysis of inequality is essentially concerned with iden-
tifying circumstances under which the above condition is satised (or not
satised). Casual observation at this stage suggests a potentially impor-
tant role for aspirations through the second term on the right-hand-side of
(7). This term captures an agents expected utility loss associated with the
possibility of failing to achieve his aspirations. Such an event occurs with
probability P (xt+1 < x) = P (t+1 < bt+1) = R bt+1 c f(t+1)dt+1 = bt+1+c2c ,
and the intensity of aversion towards it is measured by .
4 Equilibrium Outcomes
The key factor that dictates agentsbehaviour towards human capital invest-
ment is bt+1 which governs the probability of failing to achieve aspirations.
Solving for this variable is our starting point for characterising the equi-
librium of the model. Having done this, we then proceed to deduce other
equilibrium properties that form the basis of our subsequent analysis of in-
equality.
From (6), we have
bt+1 = x + (1 + r)k   A(ht +B)AB  (ht): (8)
Evidently, h(ht) < 0 which means that the probability of failing to achieve
aspirations is higher the lower is the amount of inherited human capital.
Ceteris paribus, a lower human capital inheritance implies a lower production
of output and a greater probability of falling short of target consumption.
Given the above, we may now deduce the equilibrium behaviour of agents.
We do so by recalling the expression in (7) which gives an agents expected
payo¤ from investing in human capital. Using (8), we may re-write this
expression as
Vtjit=k = A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k   

(ht) + c
2c

: (9)
As stated earlier, an agent will choose to invest in human capital if doing
so yields an expected payo¤ that is no less than the expected payo¤ from
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not investing - that is, if Vtjit=k  Vtjit=0. Using (5) and (9), this condition
can be written as A(B   b)   (1 + r)k  
h
(ht)+c
2c
i
. We assume that the
left-hand-side of this expression (which is the expected di¤erence in income
between investing and not investing in human capital) is strictly positive in
order to avoid the degenerate case in which no agent ever invests. The right-
hand-side (which is the expected disutility from not achieving aspirations)
is deduced to be an increasing function of c, a decreasing function of ht and
an increasing function of .12 Accordingly, the condition is less likely to be
satised the greater is the degree of uncertainty, the lower is the amount
of inherited human capital and the greater is the inuence of aspirations.
The crucial role played by aspirations is evident. Both a greater degree of
uncertainty and a lower endowment of human capital make it more likely
that agents will fail in realising their target consumption. Their aversion to
this may incline them not to borrow to nance human capital investment
when the probability of failure is high. Naturally, for any given probability
of failure, the disincentive to borrow is stronger the greater is the inuence of
agentsloss aversion. In the absence of any such inuence (i.e., when  = 0)
uncertainty plays no role as agents become purely risk-neutral.
5 Distribution and Inequality
The economy starts o¤ with some initial distribution of human capital that
accounts for agent heterogeneity and income inequality. Our principal con-
cern is to study the role of aspiration-induced loss aversion in governing how
the distribution changes over time and the extent to which initial inequali-
ties may vanish or persist. We proceed to do this by determining the lineage
dynamics for each dynasty that show the transition of human capital from
one generation to the next. Then, for any given initial distribution of human
capital, we may use this information to infer the dynamic processes operat-
ing at the aggregate level and thereby deduce possible long-run distribution
outcomes.
From our previous analysis, an agent will choose to invest in human cap-
ital accumulation if A(B   b)   (1 + r)k  
h
(ht)+c
2c
i
. When holding with
equality, this condition can be used to determine a critical inheritance of hu-
man capital - bh, say - which is necessary for an agent to make such a choice.
12Note that the e¤ect of c is positive because bt+1 < 0 in (8). This follows from the
fact that A(ht+B)  (1+ r)k  x > 0 must hold if human capital investment is ever to
be chosen (otherwise, the expected income from this investment would be less than target
income).
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That is,
A(B   b)  (1 + r)k = 
"
(bh) + c
2c
#
: (10)
Since h(h) < 0, this expression implies that only those agents for whom
ht  bh will willingly borrow to nance human capital investment; all other
agents for whom ht < bh will choose not do this. Evidently, the precise
value of the human capital threshold depends on certain key parameters. In
particular, we may write bh = h(c; ), where hc(c; ) > 0 and h(c; ) > 0.
Thus agents face a higher threshold the greater is the degree of uncertainty
and/or the stronger is the inuence of aspirations. The critical role played
by the latter is again self-evident: in the absence of it ( = 0), agents
inheritence of human capital would be irrelevant as all of them would invest
in human capital accumulation since A(B   b)  (1 + r)k > 0.
Given the above, together with (2), we may conclude that the intergen-
erational evolution of human capital for an individual dynasty satises
ht+1 =
(
ht + b(1 + t+1) if ht < bh;
ht +B(1 + t+1) if ht  bh: (11)
These lineage transition equations are portrayed in Figure 1. Each of them
corresponds to a stable stochastic di¤erence equation which is bounded ac-
cording to the bounds on t+1 (i.e., t+1 2 ( c; c)). The intersections with
the 450 line are given by the stationary points associated with these bounds;
that is,
h =
b(1 c)
1   ; h
 =
B(1 c)
1   : (12)
The transition equations are drawn under the parameter restriction b(1+c) <
(1  )bh < B(1  c) which we use for illustrative purposes and to make our
analysis non-trivial.13
The long-run distribution of human capital in our economy is straightfor-
ward to characterise. The only investors in human capital accumulation are
those agents who are well-endowed with human capital to begin with; these
are agents for whom h0  bh, implying convergence to some high steady state
equilibrium. All other agents who start o¤ with relatively low human capi-
tal endowments remain forever as non-investors; these are agents for whom
h0 < bh, implying convergence to some low steady state equilibrium. In terms
13For example, the restriction rules out the possibility that all agents automatically end
up either investing or not investing in human capital, and also means that any lineage
that chooses to invest at some point will never alter its choice subsequently.
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of income distribution, there is always the possibility that some generation of
investors will nd themselves worse o¤ ex post than if they had not invested.
Yet this does not a¤ect the dynamics of human capital distribution and such
agents are strictly better o¤ ex ante in terms of their higher expected in-
come from investing. The same remarks can be made about the actual and
expected payo¤s of agents.
As indicated already, the key factor in explaining our results is the exis-
tence of loss aversion caused by aspirations. The extent to which this impacts
on an agents behaviour depends on his likelihood of failing to realise his as-
pirations which, in turn, depends on his inherited human capital. The lower
is this inheritance, the higher is the probability of failure and the stronger is
the inuence of loss aversion associated with this. For agents with ht < bh,
the disutility su¤ered from under-achievement is su¢ ciently high as to de-
ter human capital investment. The number of agents for which this is true
depends on both the extent of uncertainty and the strength of aspirational
inuence. This follows from the fact that, as noted above, bh is an increasing
function of both c and . Thus, a higher value of either of these induces more
agents to forego human capital investment.
6 Further Discussion
The foregoing analysis establishes our main results. In what follows we make
several additional observations about how these results relate to other rel-
evant research and how they survive under some extensions of the model.
As regards the former, two issues attract our attention - the role of capital
market imperfections in explaining inequality and the e¤ect of uncertainty
on aggregate economic activity. As regards the latter, three modications are
considered - the generalisation of aspirational preferences, the introduction
of initial wealth endowments and the incorporation of bankruptcy consider-
ations.
6.1 Some Related Research
6.1.1 Inequality and Financial Markets
The persistence of inequality in our model is reected in the existence of
multiple, history-dependent long-run equilibria associated with threshold ef-
fects that explain how limiting outcomes depend on initial conditions. These
are the key features of models of income distribution based on credit mar-
ket imperfections (e.g., Banerjee and Newman 1993; Galor and Zeira 1993).
The signicant and novel aspect of our analysis is that it abstracts from any
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such imperfections and focuses purely on individualsaspiration-based (loss
averse) preferences as a means of accounting for inequality. With this in
mind, it is interesting to note that our results are observationally equivalent
to those obtained under a reformulation of our model in which the assumption
of aspirations is replaced by an assumption of credit market imperfections.
We demonstrate this as follows.
Suppose that aspirations are absent so that x =  = 0. Instead, assume
that borrowers have an opportunity of strategically defaulting by taking ight
and avoiding loan repayments. Lenders spend resources on tracking down
borrowers and retrieving some part of their incomes. This is now a model
of imperfect enforcement of loan contracts, where the cost of enforcement,
denoted e, and the non-retrievable fraction of borrowers income, denoted
1   2 (0; 1), provide measures of nancial market imperfection.
As we shall see, the existence of credit market frictions drives a wedge
between the lending and borrowing rates of nancial intermediaries. Denot-
ing the former by Rt+1, the size of an agents loan repayment is (1 +Rt+1)k,
implying an income of A[ht + B(1 + t+1)]  (1 + Rt+1)k if the repayment
is actually made. If not (i.e., if defaulting occurs), then the agent earns
(1  )A[ht + B(1 + t+1)]. Evidently, the agent will choose not to default
provided that A[ht+B(1+t+1)] (1+Rt+1)k  (1 )A[ht+B(1+t+1)].
From this, we may determine a critical value of t+1 - denoted t+1 - above
(below) which loan contracts are honoured (reneged upon). That is,
A[ht +B(1 + t+1)] = (1 +Rt+1)k: (13)
Naturally, t+1 is increasing in Rt+1 and decreasing in ht: ceteris paribus, the
higher is the interest rate on loans, or the lower is the inherited amount of
human capital, the more productive must be a borrower if he is to respect his
debt obligations. The probability that he will choose otherwise - that is, the
probability of defaulting - is given by P (t+1 < t+1) =
R t+1
 c f(t+1)dt+1 =
t+1+c
2c
.
If defaulting does not occur (i.e., if t+1  t+1), then intermediaries
receive the full repayment of loans, (1+Rt+1)k. If defaulting does occur (i.e.,
if t+1 < t+1), then intermediaries retrieve A[ht+B(1+ t+1)] amount of
output at a cost of e. As before, competition between interemediaries drives
their expected prots to zero. Since the cost of borrowing is (1 + r)k, this
break-even condition is given by
(1 + r)k =
Z c
t+1
(1 +Rt+1)kf(t+1)dt+1
+
Z t+1
 c
fA[ht +B(1 + t+1)]  egf(t+1)dt+1: (14)
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For any given t+1, this expression determines the contractual interest rate
on loans, Rt+1. We may write the expression in a di¤erent way by combining
it with (13) to obtain
(1 +Rt+1)k   (1 + r)k =
Z t+1
 c
A[ht +B(1 + t+1)]f(t+1)dt+1
 
Z t+1
 c
fA[ht +B(1 + t+1)]  egf(t+1)dt+1:
(15)
This shows the interest rate spread between lending and borrowing. The
magnitude of the spread depends on how much a lender expects to lose when
a borrower defaults on his loan.14 Essentially, (15) states that the contractual
interest rate is set as a simple mark-up over intermediariescost of borrowing,
where the size of mark-up is equal to the expected net income lost due to
defaulting. This mark-up rule may be simplied to
(1 +Rt+1)k = (1 + r)k +
AB(t+1 + c)
2
4c
+ e

t+1 + c
2c

: (16)
As above, there is a positive relationship between Rt+1 and t+1: ceteris
paribus, intermediaries set a higher contractual interest rate the more likely
it is that defaulting will occur.
The expressions in (13) and (16) dene a simultaneous equations system
in Rt+1 and t+1. Under the parameter restriction e  A(ht + B)   (1 +
r)k  ABc, there exists a unique feasible solution to this system, as given
by15
t+1 = c 
e
AB
 
p
4ABc[A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k   e] + e2
AB
 (c; e; ht); (17)
Rt+1 = r +
AB[(c; e; ht) + c]
2
4ck
+ e

(c; e; ht) + c
2c

 R(c; e; ht): (18)
The result in (17) implies that c(c; e; ht) > 0, e(c; e; ht) > 0 and h(c; e; ht) >
0, and the result in (18) reveals similarly that Rc(c; e; ht) > 0, Re(c; e; ht) > 0
14To be sure, observe from (13) that the rst integral term on the right-hand-side of
(15) is equal to
R t+1
 c (1 + Rt+1)kf(t+1)dt+1 which measures the expected amount of
non-repayment when defaulting occurs. Conversely, the second integral term on the right-
hand-side of (15) gives the expected amount of income that is seized from a defaulter, net
of enforcement costs.
15Details of the derivations can be found in an Appendix.
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and Rh(c; e; ht) < 0.16 In words, the greater is the degree of uncertainty,
the larger is the cost of contract enforcement and the lower is the amount
of inherited human capital, the higher is the probability of defaulting on
loans and the higher is the contractual interest rate on loans. The e¤ects
of uncertainty are due to the fact that the loan repayment is a non-linear
(specically, concave) function of t+1. To be sure, recall that the repayment
is A[ht + B(1 + t+1)] if t+1 < t+1, but (1 + Rt+1)k if t+1  t+1. The
expected repayment is therefore reduced by a mean-preserving spread in the
distribution of t+1. Intermediaries compensate for this by charging a higher
interest rate on loans which increases the likelihood that defaulting will oc-
cur. The e¤ects of enforcement costs and inherited human capital operate
in a similar way. An increase in e or a decrease in ht reduces intermediaries
expected net returns which raises the contractual interest rate and makes
defaulting more likely.
Having established the above, we may now turn our attention to the
equilibrium behaviour of agents. An agents expected payo¤ from investing
in human capital is
Vtjit=k =
Z c
t+1
fA[ht +B(1 + t+1)]  (1 +Rt+1)kgf(t+1)dt+1
+
Z t+1
 c
(1  )A[ht +B(1 + t+1)]f(t+1)dt+1: (19)
Using (14) and (17), we may write this as
Vtjit=k =
Z c
 c
A[ht +B(1 + t+1)]f(t+1)dt+1   (1 + r)k
 e
Z t+1
 c
f(t+1)dt+1
= A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k   e

(c; e; ht) + c
2c

: (20)
The condition for human capital investment to be chosen is Vtjit=k  Vtjit=0
which, from (20) and (5) (with x = 0), implies A(B   b)   (1 + r)k 
e
h
(c;e;ht)+c
2c
i
. As before, this condition is less likely to be satised the greater
is the degree of uncertainty, c, and/or the lower is the amount of inherited
16Verication of these results is again contained in the Appendix. Note that one does not
need to assume that nancial intermediaries are able to observe human capital directly. As
shown in (17) and (18), t+1 and Rt+1 are functions of Aht, which is the output produced
by parents. One needs only to assume that this is observable (in which case, of course, ht
can be trivially inferred anyway).
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human capital, ht, each of which raises the right-hand-side term. Addition-
ally, this is true for a larger cost of contract enforcement, e. When holding
with equality, the condition implies a critical level of ht - denoted h - above
(below) which human capital investment is chosen (declined). That is,
A(B   b)  (1 + r)k = e

(c; e; h) + c
2c

: (21)
In turn, this expression yields h = h(c; e), where hc(c; e) > 0 and he(c; e) > 0.
Thus agents face a higher human capital threshold the greater is the degree of
uncertainty (as was present before) and/or the higher is the cost of contract
enforcement (as was absent before).
The observational equivalence between these results and those established
earlier is self-evident (compare, in particular, (21) with (10)). Essentially, e
substitutes for  in a way that makes the e¤ects of credit market imperfec-
tions very similar to the e¤ects of aspirations (or loss aversion). This nding
echoes the sentiments of Carroll (2001) who argues that, in many instances of
uncertainty, the existence of a precautionary savings motive can generate be-
haviour that is virtually indistinguishable from the behaviour that emerges
from the existence of liquidity constraints. The same is true with respect
to loss aversion and credit market frictions. The outcomes may be similar
in the sense that some individuals forego borrowing opportunities, but the
reasons are fundamentally di¤erent: in the case of loss aversion, there is
a self-imposed reluctance towards borrowing; in the case of credit market
frictions, there is an externally-imposed obstacle to borrowing.
6.1.2 Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Performance
The distributional e¤ects of uncertainty in our model have implications for
aggregate productive activity in the economy. This follows from the fact that
the productivity of agents who invest in human capital is di¤erent from the
productivity of agents who refrain from such investment. Since the number
of investors and non-investors is determined by the degree of uncertainty,
then so too is the total level of output. In this way, our analysis bears
on other research that seeks to explore the link between uncertainty and
macroeconomic performance.17
17For example, there is a large body of research that shows how uncertainty (or volatil-
ity) can inuence long-term growth (either positively or negatively) through various factors
(e.g., Aghion and Saint-Paul 1998; Blackburn and Varvarigos 2008; de Hek 1999; Jones
et al. 2005; Martin and Rogers 2000). Whilst we do not consider long-term growth, our
analysis identies another factor that can create a link between uncertainty and macro-
economic performance - namely, the impact of uncertainty on distribution outcomes.
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Let gt(ht) be the probability density function of human capital at time
t. Suppose that human capital is initially distributed over the interval (h; h)
such that
R h
h
gt(ht)dht = 1 (corresponding to the unit mass of agents). In
each period there is the same population of non-investors in human cap-
ital,
R bh
h
gt(ht)dht, and the same population of investors in human capital,R hbh gt(ht)dht. From (3) and (11), the expected output of a non-investor is
A(ht+ b), whilst the expected output of an investor is A(ht+B). Accord-
ingly, the expected total (or average) level of output in the economy is given
by
Yt+1 =
Z bh
h
A(ht + b)gt(ht)dht +
Z h
bh A(ht +B)gt(ht)dht
= A
Z h
h
htgt(ht)dht + A[b
Z bh
h
gt(ht)dht +B
Z h
bh gt(ht)dht]: (22)
Recall that bh = h(c; ), where hc(c; ) > 0 and h(c; ) > 0. Since B > b, it
follows that, for any given gt(ht), an increase in c, which increases bh, implies
a decrease in the second right-hand-side term of (22), thus causing a decrease
in Yt+1. In words, a greater degree of uncertainty is associated with a lower
average level of output as fewer agents choose to invest in human capital. It
may also be noted that an increase in  has the same e¤ect, meaning that
a stronger inuence of aspirations (or loss aversion) reduces macroeconomic
performance.
6.2 Some Extensions
6.2.1 Generalising Aspirations
Our treatment of aspirations in moulding agentspreferences led to the ob-
jective function in (1). Whilst this allows for any arbitrary reference level of
income, x, it is based on the assumption (made for convenience) that agents
are a¤ected by their aspirations only because of the disappointment of not
achieving them, not because of the satisfaction from fullling them. In what
follows we modify this feature.
Let P (xt+1  x) denote the probability of success in attaining aspira-
tions. An agents objective function is now given by
Vt = E(xt+1   x) + P (xt+1  x)  P (xt+1 < x): (23)
The expression in (6) for determining bt+1 continues to apply, and the agents
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expected payo¤ from human capital investment is given by
Vtjit=k =
Z c
 c
fA[ht +B(1 + t+1)]  (1 +Rt+1)kgf(t+1)dt+1
+ 
Z c
bt+1 f(t+1)dt+1   
Z bt+1
 c
f(t+1)dt+1   x: (24)
= A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k +   (+ )

(ht) + c
2c

(25)
Since the expected payo¤ to a non-investor is Vtjit=0 = A[ht+b] x+, the
condition for investment to be chosen is A(B b) (1+r)k  (+)
h
(ht)+c
2c
i
,
from which we may deduce a critical level of human capital, bh, above which
an agent invests and below which an agent does not invest: that is,
A(B   b)  (1 + r)k = (+ )

(ht) + c
2c

: (26)
Clearly, the results of our main analysis (which can be recovered by set-
ting  = 0) are not signicantly altered by the generalisation of preferences
reected in (23).
6.2.2 Introducing Wealth
Intergenerational linkages in our model take place through the serendipitous
intra-family transfers of human capital. In other models these linkages are
the result of altruistic bequests of wealth which may inuence opportunities
for borrowing in the presence of capital market imperfections. We outline
how our model may be extended to include a bequest motive.
Suppose that agents derive utility from their own consumption, ct+1, and
the bequests they leave to their o¤spring, qt+1. Ex post (i.e., after incomes
have been realised), their aim is to maximise u(ct+1; qt+1) = c

t+1q
1 
t+1 ( 2
(0; 1),  = [(1   )1 ] 1) subject to ct+1 + qt+1 = zt+1, where zt+1 is
nal income. They do this by choosing ct+1 = zt+1 and qt+1 = (1  )zt+1,
implying an indirect utility of U(zt+1) = zt+1. An agent evaluates this with
reference to some threshold outcome, z, that he aspires to attain and that
he fails to do so with probability P (zt+1 < z). Ex ante (i.e., before any
decisions have been made), the agents value function is
Vt = E(zt+1   z)  P (zt+1 < z): (27)
Suppose that parents invest bequests on behalf of their children (e.g., in
a trust fund) who become entitled to their inheritance when old. This means
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that agents are unable to use bequests to nance human capital investment
when young. The expression for nal income is therefore given by zt+1 =
xt+1 + (1 + r)qt, where xt+1 is determined according to (4).
Assume that an agents threshold income is some xed value above his
inheritance, z = (1 + r)qt + x. Thus agents aspire to be better o¤ than
they would be from relying solely on the altruism of their parents. Given
this, then (27) can be re-written as (1). All of our original results can be re-
established, with straightforward implications for the dynamics of bequests,
qt+1 = (1  )[xt+1 + (1 + r)qt].
6.2.3 Incorporating Bankruptcy
A notable feature maintained throughout our analysis has been the absence
of any bankruptcy considerations. This has been useful in terms of focusing
attention and simplifying the analysis. Nevertheless, it is instructive to see
how our model of aspirations can be adapted to study issues of bankruptcy,
issues that gure prominently in many areas of macroeconomics. In doing
this, we are able to demonstrate further the broader context of our analysis
and its potential for further application.
We allow for the possibility that agents who invest in human capital may
be unable to repay their loans. Under such circumstances, agents declare
bankruptcy and intermediaries seize whatever output is produced. Based on
this, one might plausibly consider the avoidance of bankruptcy to be a fairly
natural candidate for aspirations. Adopting this criteria, an agent succeeds
or fails in achieving his aspirations according to whether xt+1 > 0 or xt+1 = 0.
His value function is then given by
Vt = E(xt+1)  P (xt+1 = 0): (28)
Obviously, bankruptcy is not an issue if an agent abstains from human
capital investment, in which case his consumption is A[ht + b(1 + t+1)].
If the agent invests in human capital, then his consumption is determined
as follows. The possibility of bankruptcy means that intermediaries charge
an interest rate on loans, Rt+1, which is di¤erent from their interest cost
of borrowing, r. The size of an agents loan repayment is therefore given by
(1+Rt+1)k. The agent is able to make this repayment ifA[ht+B(1+t+1)] 
(1+Rt+1)k, in which case his consumption isA[ht+B(1+t+1)] (1+Rt+1)k;
otherwise, if A[ht +B(1 + t+1)] < (1 +Rt+1)k, the agent is bankrupt and
his consumption is zero as lenders appropriate whatever output is produced.
These observations lead us to dene a critical value of t+1, denoted et+1, such
that bankruptcy is avoided if t+1  et+1 and is unavoided if t+1 < et+1.
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That is,
A[ht +B(1 + et+1)] = (1 +Rt+1)k: (29)
Naturally, et+1 is increasing in Rt+1 and decreasing in ht: ceteris paribus, the
higher is the interest rate on loans, or the lower is the inherited amount of
human capital, the more productive must be a borrower if he is to be able
to make his loan repayment. The probability that he is unable to do this -
that is, the probability of bankruptcy - is given by P (xt+1 = 0) = P (t+1 <et+1) = R et+1 c f(t+1)dt+1 = et+1+c2c . This is also the probability of failing to
achieve aspirations.
If bankruptcy is not declared (i.e., if t+1  et+1), then intermediaries
are paid back in full, earning a return of (1 + Rt+1)k. If bankruptcy is
declared (i.e., if t+1 < et+1), then agentsproclamations are veried and
intermediaries retrieve all of the output produced, A[ht + B(1 + t+1)].
In keeping with our original analysis, we abstract from any capital market
imperfections that might arise in the case of bankruptcy. In particular, we
assume that intermediaries can verify bankruptcy claims at zero cost, or can
directly observe the output of agents. We shall return to this later. For now,
we note that the zero prot condition on intermediaries implies
(1 + r)k =
Z c
et+1(1 +Rt+1)kf(t+1)dt+1
+
Z et+1
 c
A[ht +B(1 + t+1)]f(t+1)dt+1: (30)
In conjunction with (29), this gives the following expression for the interest
rate spread between borrowing and lending:
(1 +Rt+1)k   (1 + r)k =
Z et+1
 c
A[ht +B(1 + bt+1)]f(t+1)dt+1
 
Z et+1
 c
A[ht +B(1 + t+1)]f(t+1)dt+1: (31)
The size of spread depends on how much a lender expects to lose when a
borrower claims that he is bankrupt and fails to repay his loan.18 Similar
to our model of strategic defaulting, (31) determines the contractual interest
rate as a mark-up over intermediariescost of borrowing, where the size of
18From (29), the rst integral term on the right-hand-side of (31) is equal to
R bt+1
 c (1 +
Rt+1)kf(t+1)dt+1 which is the expected amount of non-repayment when bankruptcy
is declared. Conversely, the second integral term on the right-hand-side of (31) is the
expected amount of income that is claimed in the case of bankruptcy.
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mark-up is equal to the expected net income lost due to bankruptcy. This
mark-up rule may be simplied to
(1 +Rt+1)k = (1 + r)k +
AB(et+1 + c)2
4c
: (32)
As before, there is a positive relationship between Rt+1 and et+1: ceteris
paribus, intermediaries set a higher contractual interest rate the more likely
it is that bankruptcy will be declared.
The expressions in (29) and (32) dene a simultaneous equations system
inRt+1 and et+1. Under the parameter restriction 0  A(ht+B) (1+r)k 
ABc, there exists a unique feasible solution to this system, as given by19
et+1 = c  2rc[A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k]AB  (c; ht); (33)
Rt+1 = r +
AB[(c; ht) + c]
2
4ck
 R(c; ht): (34)
The result in (33) implies that c(c; ht) > 0 and h(c; ht) < 0, and the result
in (34) reveals similarly that Rc(c; ht) > 0 and Rh(c; ht) < 0. Thus both
the probability of bankruptcy and the rate of interest on loans are increased
by an increase in the degree of uncertainty and a decrease in the amount of
inherited human capital.20
Given the above, we deduce the equilibrium behaviour of agents as follows.
An agents expected payo¤ from investing in human capital is
Vtjit=k =
Z c
et+1fA[ht +B(1 + t+1)]  (1 +Rt+1)kgf(t+1)dt+1
  
Z et+1
 c
f(t+1)dt+1 (35)
Using (30) and (33), we may write this as
Vtjit=k =
Z c
 c
A[ht +B(1 + t+1)]f(t+1)dt+1   (1 + r)k
 
Z et+1
 c
f(t+1)dt+1
= A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k   

(c; ht) + c
2c

: (36)
19The solution can be obtained directly from (17) and (18) by setting  = 1 and e = 0.
20These results, and the intuition for them, are the same as those obtained in our model
of strategic defaulting.
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The condition for human capital investment to be chosen is Vtjit=k  Vtjit=0
which, from (36) and (5), implies A(B  b)  (1+ r)k  
h
(ht;c)+c
2c
i
. This is
very similar to the condition obtained in our original analysis and displays
the same properties. Specically, the condition is less likely to be satised the
greater is the degree of uncertainty, c, the lower is the amount of inherited
human capital, ht, and the greater is the inuence of aspirations, . Likewise,
the condition can be used to infer a critical level of human capital, eh, above
(below) which human capital investment is chosen (declined). That is,
(B   b)  (1 + r)k = 
"
(eh; c) + c
2c
#
: (37)
In turn, this expression yields eh = h(c; ), where hc(c; ) > 0 and h(c; ) >
0. The intuition for these results is exactly the same as before: agents who
are relatively poor in terms of their human capital endowments may choose
to forego risky, but potentially protable, human capital investment because
of their relatively strong aversion to failing in their aspirations. The present
analysis provides a specic application of this, where loss aversion means
bankruptcy aversion and where the aspiration to succeed means the aspira-
tion to avoid bankruptcy.
A nal observation relates to our earlier demonstration of how behaviour
under aspirational inuences can look almost identical to behaviour under
capital market imperfections. The same result can be established in the
present context and with a di¤erent type of imperfection to the one consid-
ered previously. Assuming that aspirations are absent, suppose that borrow-
ers and lenders face an ex post informational asymmetry such that only the
former can directly observe the realisation of t+1, whereas the latter must
incur expenditures to make this observation. Such expenditures are incurred
if a borrower claims bankruptcy since the claim needs to be veried in order
to prevent a borrower from falsely declaring that he is unable to repay his
loan. This is now a model of costly state verication, where the cost of ver-
ication provides a measure of credit market imperfections (e.g., Diamond
1984; Gale and Hellwig 1985; Townsend 1979).21 The formal structure of the
model is readily obtained from our earlier model of strategic defaulting by
setting  = 1 and reinterpreting e as a verication (rather than enforcement)
cost. The end result is the expression in (26) which again bears a striking
resemblance to (37).
21See Krasa and Villamil (2000) for conditions under which debt is optimal in a costly
state verication model.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has sought to make a theoretical contribution to the literature on
inequality and income distribution. Its approach has been to focus on the
structure of preferences, rather than the functioning of markets, as a way of
explaining the diverse behaviour and diverse fortunes of individuals who face
uncertainty. This o¤ers a new perspective on why some individuals do not
pursue potentially wealth-enhancing opportunities: the reason is not that
they are prevented from doing so, but rather that it is not in their interests
to do so. For such agents, the loss that may be incurred on a risky venture is
simply too great to make the venture attractive, even if it o¤ers the prospect
of high rewards. For other agents, the same loss may be of much less concern
so that the venture is taken on. These cohorts of individuals are the less
wealthy and the more wealthy members of the population. The former may
stand to gain relatively more if an investment goes well, but they also risk
losing relatively more if the investment goes wrong. Under the inuence
of aspiration-induced loss aversion, it is the disliking of losses, rather than
the liking of gains, that matters most to individuals, which is why the less
wealthy of themmay abstain from opportunities that could make them better
o¤.
Our analysis raises important questions about the appropriateness and ef-
fectiveness of strategies aimed at redistribution. If inequality was the result
of market imperfections, then the natural prescription for reducing inequal-
ity would be the attenuation of these imperfections. In the case of nancial
markets, for example, improvements in monitoring and enforcement would
presumably make borrowing more accessible to greater numbers of individu-
als who might otherwise be denied loans. But if inequality was rooted in the
deep structure of preferences, it is much less obvious what options are avail-
able and feasible. And if this source of inequality was mistaken for another
(a possibility that we alluded to), then one may end up with well-meaning
strategies that are ine¤ectual (and perhaps even worse if they are costly to
implement). One possible approach suggested specically by our analysis is
the enhancement of human capital accumulation (e.g., through better qual-
ity public education and health programmes) that may push individuals over
the human capital threshold by making their aspirations more attainable. In
a broader context, to the extent that the poor wealth status of some individ-
uals may make them unable (because of imperfections) or unwilling (because
of preferences) to try to improve their status, lump-sum redistributions from
the rich to the poor may o¤er the most straightforward means of reducing
inequality. Further exploration of these issues is an avenue worth pursuing.
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Appendix
The results in (17) and (18) are derived as follows. Combining (13) and (16)
yields the quadratic equation
0 = AB2t+1   2(ABc  e)t+1
  f4c[A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k]  ABc2   2ecg: (A1)
Hence
t+1 = c 
e
AB

p
4ABc[A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k   e] + e2
AB
: (A2)
A su¢ cient condition for ruling out complex roots is A(ht+B)  (1+r)k+e.
Given this, together with the fact that t+1  c, the only possible solution
to (A2) is when
p enters negatively, as shown in (17). The restriction
A(ht + B)  (1 + r)k + ABc ensures that t+1   c as well. Having
obtained (17), the result in (18) is obtained by appropriate substitution in
(16).
The properties of the functions (c; e; ht) and R(c; e; ht) are established
as follows. From (17) and (18), one nds that
c() = 1 
2[A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k   e]p
4ABc[A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k   e] + e2
; (A3)
e() =  
1
AB
"
1  (2ABc  e)p
4ABc[A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k   e] + e2
#
(A4)
h() =  
2Acp
4ABc[A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k   e] + e2
; (A5)
Rc() = (() + c)
c2

AB[(cc() + c) + (cc()  c)]
4k
+
e(cc()  c)
2

;
(A6)
Re() = AB(() + c)e()
2ck
+
ee() + () + c
2c
(A7)
Rh() = AB[() + c]h()
2ck
+
eh()
2c
: (A8)
Under the above parameter restrictions, it is deduced that c() > 0, e() >
0, h() < 0, Rc() > 0, Re() > 0 and Rh() < 0.
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